柯伟林／两国难逃一战？美中不会落入「修昔底德陷阱」
▲《慧眼看天下》的节目主持人黄宝慧独家专访哈佛大学教授、知名中国专家柯伟林（William Kirby）。（图／ETtoday，下同）
●柯伟林（William Kirby）／曾经担任哈佛大学文理学院院长、哈佛大学费正清中国研究中心主任。为国际知名的现代中国史专家，擅长从国际脉络下检视中国近现代历史，尤其是商业、经济和政治的发展状况。精研两岸、美中台关系。
他也针对中国进行多方面进行研究，包括中国的商业、企业营运、经济、教育及政治发展等范畴。相当喜爱台湾的他也是位「台湾专家」，对台湾也有一定程度上的研究。
身为美国学者，在历史研究、教学和著作皆有优异的表现，加上对中国、台湾两岸关系有深刻的研究，在国际上被公认是一位出色的美国汉学家。
台湾许多学者专家、政治人物都曾向他取经，包括前总统马英九等人。更有部分的人认为，柯伟林的地位高过「竞争战略之父」迈克尔•波特（Michael Porter）。
（编按：美国总统川普和中国领导人习近平日前在G20峰会上，双方达成协议，美中贸易战有90天的缓冲期。但是，90天后，贸易战是否会重启？目前都还是未知数。对此，柯伟林独家接受《慧眼看天下》节目主持人黄宝慧的专访时，对美中贸易战以及美、中、台关系发表相关看法。）
以下部分节录自专访
主持人黄宝慧：教授，我们知道美国总统川普和中国领导人刚达成协议，在G20峰会，双方有90天的缓冲期来降低紧张。为什么呢？90天后，贸易战是否会重启？目前为止，哪个国家占上风呢？因为我记得在您某一次访问中，曾说过中美之间的冲突，对台湾向来都是坏消息。
柯伟林：我想确实如此。在这个状况下，台湾有点像是贸易战中的附带损害。我想目前没有任何一方占上风。倘若还要继续维持好一段时间的话，可说是经济上的相互保证毁灭。我不认为会这样，因为对中美关系对双方来说都太重要了。而且双方有太多行为者，有太多所谓的利益团体，或太多人跟对方的经济相连，对两个经济体都是如此，都认为贸易战不该持续太久。即便如此，不论是暂停或是停战，就美国的观点来看，都是让中方提出反制措施的机会。这很困难…很容易可以想像…双方都可以在90天或180天内宣布胜利。在这种贸易纠纷中，有很多保留面子的方法。美日以往的关系有许多例子。其实台美1980年代的经济问题，也是围绕着严重的贸易争端。
而在90天内不会发生的事，是中方，即便想要，也不会改变自己基本的方向，与基本政治经济体制的特色，但这些其实在许多方面，就是此次争端的中心。
黄宝慧：我注意到您对于川普政府有做出一些评论。您曾经在台湾媒体的访问中提到，中美贸易战是由川普政府所引起，这个政府既不专业，也忽视了中美贸易关系与国际现实。因此现在…
柯伟林：我想我相当正确。
紧张关系将持续多久？
黄宝慧：是的，相当正确。但我们看到川普总统已经采取强势的立场处理对中国的贸易、南海、与其他议题。在可预见的未来，美中关系的紧张局势是否会持续下去？
柯伟林：我想可能会在几个方面持续下去。但首先，在刚上任的一年半内，川普政府在这个政策领域，就如同在其他领域，展现惊人的无能、组织不良、与缺乏准备的总和，例如你问中国的资深对话者/官员（interlocutors），跟川普政府打交道时，应该找谁？他们能提出最好的答案，就是库什纳（Kushner）家族。这其实不够好，坦白说，而且川普政府花了很长的时间，才把资深人员部署到国务院、国防部、国安会，他们才对中国有认真的了解。
即便如此，现在川普政府已经上任将近两年，才开始有一致性的中国政策。在许多领域，都是强硬的政策，在政治事务、意识形态，甚至可以说在安全事务，和经济事务都是。为什么会这样？很难说，但川普现在身边的顾问，现在比起以前，有了较多的一致性。
美国副总统潘斯（Mike Pence）也许最近说得最为清楚。但如果你去看看重要的因果关系，在过去五年习近平领导下的中国，已经大大的左倾。对许多观察家来说，毫不意外，大力左倾会增加党的控制，增加国营企业，减少进入，或明显减少国际企业进入中国市场，希望能在国内和国外创造中国的赢家和国家的支持者。在此同时，川普领导的美国也已经…以非常没有组织的方式向右倾。双方在许多议题更加的悖离。我想这种长期趋势会继续下去，不论是在处理南海议题、不论是处理中国在东亚的外交关系、不论是处理中国国内的经济政策或国际经济政策。
黄宝慧：您刚才提到潘斯副总统。他似乎对中国采取非常鹰派的立场。潘斯副总统在10月的演讲，给中国直率的警告，不少人解读为美国发动新冷战，到底美中未来是否真的会形成冷战？美中的冷战与美苏的冷战在本质上是一样的吗？
柯伟林：首先，我不认为会有另一次冷战。美国和中国比起过去美苏，有更多共同的利益。美国和苏联在冷战时期，陷入全球争霸的斗争中。现在的世界，已经不再是代理人战争，有上千枚飞弹针锋相对，或是柏林的剑拔弩张…从1948年的封锁，持续到1989年柏林围墙倒塌。现在已经大不相同。过去中美没有广泛的贸易文化关系，不像现在中美有许许多多的共同点。但如果你看潘斯的演讲，这是一篇绝佳的演讲。我建议您的观众应该要阅读他演讲的全文，加上，在中美关系历史中，这篇演讲充满迷思，这是美国人想看到中美关系，或是某些美国人想看到的中美关系。
柯伟林：例如美国和中国，根据这篇演讲，向来维持很好的关系，直到1949年。美国是中国友好的力量。美国在19世纪和中国进行贸易，买卖皮草和香料。但不知道是什么原因，潘斯先生忘了鸦片，但其实鸦片对于波士顿地区，是重要的贸易来源。我想潘斯的演讲，是美国针对中国从1950或60年代以来，最为强硬的说词，它读起来，好像也是写于50或60年代，如果你把中国替换成苏联的话。这篇演讲只有在局势失控的情况下，才会更显重要。现在我认为这是美国右倾势力面对中国时的强硬观点的声明。
黄宝慧：最近有个词叫「修昔底德陷阱」，这是由一位哈佛教授提出的理论。
柯伟林：格雷厄姆•艾利森（Graham Allison）教授，来自甘迺迪学院，您从那里毕业。
黄宝慧：是的，没错。这个词的意思是一个新兴大国挑战现有的强权时，两国终须一战。请问您的看法是？
柯伟林：我是艾利森教授的好朋友，也相当景仰他。但我身为历史学家，在此恕难同意他的看法。确实，新型国家总是会与现有大国产生冲突。有时候会发生，但有时候也不会发生。英国知名的历史学家 A.J.P.泰勒（A.J.P. Taylor）曾说过一句名言：「战争从来都不是无可避免，直到爆发时，政治人物有责任要尽全力避免战争爆发。」看看我们的世界，我们在2018年的台北。这是个繁荣的时代，这是个和平的时代。从1979年中越战争到现在，目前可说是东亚从鸦片战争以后，有史以来最长久的承平时期。没有和平，就没有繁荣。我无法想像，任何情境我都无法想像，不论是对中国或美国，我们的国家利益能透过发动战争来巩固。中国没有敌人，中国的边境没有受到任何国威胁。不是俄国、不是日本、也不是台湾，除非国民党想要反攻大陆。不是越南、不是印度。中国边境唯一的威胁来自北韩，因为你永远不知道他们什么时候会发射飞弹过来。中国拥有在近代史上最佳的策略位置，也必须了解这是多么珍贵的时代。
美国，很不幸的，近年来都没有发生战争。美国不想卷入战争，但却付出了极为高昂的代价，如果你看阿富汗跟伊拉克。美国的战略利益里，完全不必要跟中国发生军事冲突。因此，我不认为战争是无可避免的，我也不相信有可能会发生战争。
以下为专访中文翻译全文：
黄宝慧：教授，我们知道美国总统川普和中国领导人刚达成协议，在G20峰会，双方有90天的缓冲期来降低紧张。为什么呢？90天后，贸易战是否会重启？目前为止，哪个国家占上风呢？因为我记得在您某一次访问中，曾说过中美之间的冲突，对台湾向来都是坏消息。
柯伟林：我想确实如此。在这个状况下，台湾有点像是贸易战中的附带损害。我想目前没有任何一方占上风。倘若还要继续维持好一段时间的话，可说是经济上的相互保证毁灭。我不认为会这样，因为对中美关系对双方来说都太重要了。而且双方有太多行为者，有太多所谓的利益团体，或太多人跟对方的经济相连，对两个经济体都是如此，都认为贸易战不该持续太久。即便如此，不论是暂停或是停战，就美国的观点来看，都是让中方提出反制措施的机会。这很困难…很容易可以想像…双方都可以在90天或180天内宣布胜利。在这种贸易纠纷中，有很多保留面子的方法。美日以往的关系有许多例子。其实台美1980年代的经济问题，也是围绕着严重的贸易争端。
而在90天内不会发生的事，是中方，即便想要，也不会改变自己基本的方向，与基本政治经济体制的特色，但这些其实在许多方面，就是此次争端的中心。
黄宝慧：我注意到您对于川普政府有做出一些评论。您曾经在台湾媒体的访问中提到，中美贸易战是由川普政府所引起，这个政府既不专业，也忽视了中美贸易关系与国际现实。因此现在…
柯伟林：我想我相当正确。
黄宝慧：是的，相当正确。但我们看到川普总统已经采取强势的立场处理对中国的贸易、南海、与其他议题。在可预见的未来，美中关系的紧张局势是否会持续下去？
柯伟林：我想可能会在几个方面持续下去。但首先，在刚上任的一年半内，川普政府在这个政策领域，就如同在其他领域，展现惊人的无能、组织不良、与缺乏准备的总和，例如你问中国的资深对话者/官员（interlocutors），跟川普政府打交道时，应该找谁？他们能提出最好的答案，就是库什纳（Kushner）家族。这其实不够好，坦白说，而且川普政府花了很长的时间，才把资深人员部署到国务院、国防部、国安会，他们才对中国有认真的了解。即便如此，现在川普政府已经上任将近两年，才开始有一致性的中国政策。在许多领域，都是强硬的政策，在政治事务、意识形态，甚至可以说在安全事务，和经济事务都是。为什么会这样？很难说，但川普现在身边的顾问，现在比起以前，有了较多的一致性。
潘斯副总统也许最近说得最为清楚。但如果你去看看重要的因果关系，在过去五年习近平领导下的中国，已经大大的左倾。对许多观察家来说，毫不意外，大力左倾会增加党的控制，增加国营企业，减少进入，或明显减少国际企业进入中国市场，希望能在国内和国外创造中国的赢家和国家的支持者。在此同时，川普领导的美国也已经…以非常没有组织的方式向右倾。双方在许多议题更加的悖离。我想这种长期趋势会继续下去，不论是在处理南海议题、不论是处理中国在东亚的外交关系、不论是处理中国国内的经济政策或国际经济政策。
黄宝慧：您刚才提到潘斯副总统。他似乎对中国采取非常鹰派的立场。潘斯副总统在10月的演讲，给中国直率的警告，不少人解读为美国发动新冷战，到底美中未来是否真的会形成冷战？美中的冷战与美苏的冷战在本质上是一样的吗？
柯伟林：首先，我不认为会有另一次冷战。美国和中国比起过去美苏，有更多共同的利益。美国和苏联在冷战时期，陷入全球争霸的斗争中。现在的世界，已经不再是代理人战争，有上千枚飞弹针锋相对，或是柏林的剑拔弩张…从1948年的封锁，持续到1989年柏林围墙倒塌。现在已经大不相同。过去中美没有广泛的贸易文化关系，不像现在中美有许许多多的共同点。但如果你看潘斯的演讲，这是一篇绝佳的演讲。我建议您的观众应该要阅读他演讲的全文，加上，在中美关系历史中，这篇演讲充满迷思，这是美国人想看到中美关系，或是某些美国人想看到的中美关系。
柯伟林：例如美国和中国，根据这篇演讲，向来维持很好的关系，直到1949年。美国是中国友好的力量。美国在19世纪和中国进行贸易，买卖皮草和香料。但不知道是什么原因，潘斯先生忘了鸦片，但其实鸦片对于波士顿地区，是重要的贸易来源。我想潘斯的演讲，是美国针对中国从1950或60年代以来，最为强硬的说词，它读起来，好像也是写于50或60年代，如果你把中国替换成苏联的话。这篇演讲只有在局势失控的情况下，才会更显重要。现在我认为这是美国右倾势力面对中国时的强硬观点的声明。
黄宝慧：最近有个词叫「修昔底德陷阱」，这是由一位哈佛教授提出的理论。
柯伟林：格雷厄姆•艾利森（Graham Allison）教授，来自甘迺迪学院，您从那里毕业。
黄宝慧：是的，没错。这个词的意思是一个新兴大国挑战现有的强权时，两国终须一战。请问您的看法是？
柯伟林：我是艾利森教授的好朋友，也相当景仰他。但我身为历史学家，在此恕难同意他的看法。确实，新型国家总是会与现有大国产生冲突。有时候会发生，但有时候也不会发生。英国知名的历史学家 A.J.P.泰勒（A.J.P. Taylor）曾说过一句名言：「战争从来都不是无可避免，直到爆发时，政治人物有责任要尽全力避免战争爆发。」看看我们的世界，我们在2018年的台北。这是个繁荣的时代，这是个和平的时代。从1979年中越战争到现在，目前可说是东亚从鸦片战争以后，有史以来最长久的承平时期。没有和平，就没有繁荣。我无法想像，任何情境我都无法想像，不论是对中国或美国，我们的国家利益能透过发动战争来巩固。中国没有敌人，中国的边境没有受到任何国威胁。不是俄国、不是日本、也不是台湾，除非国民党想要反攻大陆。不是越南、不是印度。中国边境唯一的威胁来自北韩，因为你永远不知道他们什么时候会发射飞弹过来。中国拥有在近代史上最佳的策略位置，也必须了解这是多么珍贵的时代。
美国，很不幸的，近年来都没有发生战争。美国不想卷入战争，但却付出了极为高昂的代价，如果你看阿富汗跟伊拉克。美国的战略利益里，完全不必要跟中国发生军事冲突。因此，我不认为战争是无可避免的，我也不相信有可能会发生战争。
黄宝慧：那我觉得安心许多。
柯伟林：好，谢谢。
黄宝慧：我们知道您不仅是中美专家，也是台湾专家，我们知道您非常喜欢台湾。
柯伟林：我第一趟亚洲行就是很多很多年前到台湾。
黄宝慧：您在哪里学中文？
柯伟林：我在台湾师范大学国语中心学中文，在中央研究院近代历史研究所做研究，所以台湾其实是我为什么成为教授的原因之一，因为我在这里，在台湾进行中国研究有很好的开始。
黄宝慧：太棒了！所以您仔细观察台湾发生的状况。就在台湾地方选举结果在11月底公布后，就在两周前，美国国务院立刻在推特发出声明，「祝贺台湾再次成功举行自由与公正的选举，台湾的宪政民主是印太地区的典范。」请问您如何解读这个讯息？为何是印太地区？美方的立场为何？
柯伟林：这个问题很好。您可以说这个声明是美国建议台湾可以成为中国大陆的模范。并不是…其实有更多涵意。「印太」一词没有具体定义，可以有各种解释，从巴基斯坦到阿留申群岛都算。但台湾作为了不起的民主典范…我认为这项声明是正确的。意思是台湾选票计算的速度比美国各州更快且公平。我希望台湾不只是印太的典范，或许也可以成为北美的典范，至少当美国的典范，我们在美国要计算所有的选票还是有很大的困难。
黄宝慧：教授，我们刚才提到了中美间的冲突对台湾向来都是坏消息。
柯伟林：是的。
黄宝慧：夹在中美两强之间，两强的任何一个举动，都会影响到台湾，处在这当中，台湾政府应该如何因应？
柯伟林：我认为台湾必须处理…中华民国必须处理自己的利益、自己的安全，应该跟美中两国都保持友好稳健的各种关系，能够让安全维持下去。安全与繁荣…再过去几年，台湾受益于经济…我应该说受益于和中国的文化连结，当然还有与美国的连结。台湾在两岸关系达到某个程度的正常化，却没有统一。这项了不起的成就，就我看来，不应该轻易受到危害。
柯伟林：我认为台湾应该…你知道…或许蔡总统最好不要再接川普打来的电话了，但台湾再次展现了稳健的民主，这是此次选举的成就，是几年前上次选举的成就，也是我所见证过台湾每次总统选举的成就。这是中华民国的公民应该深以为荣的成就。
黄宝慧：您提到最好不要再接川普总统的电话。据说现任蔡英文总统受到美国政府支持，而下任总统大选呼声很高的另一位候选人，您的好友，前总统马英九，则受到中国青睐。您怎么看待台湾2020年的总统大选？
柯伟林：我的猜测是竞争会很激烈，或许没有像到时同时举行的美国大选那么激烈，但我不同意蔡总统、或是马总统，是受到美方的青睐或是不青睐这样的说法。就以这个例子来说，美国支持任何当选且代表台湾人民的总统。
黄宝慧：但中国确实比较喜欢马总统。
柯伟林：或许在马总统任内，与中国大陆维持较为长期的友好关系，但我不认为最近选举结果，国民党的成功，就带表示这是对两岸关系公投的唯一指标。确实，国民党的候选人未必是支持中国，我想这里大部分的候选人，就我了解，所有来自各党的候选人，都是支持台湾，这点至关重要。他们的差别，当然就是在如何处理两岸关系，这样的关系应该有什么原则。但如果举例来看，这里我觉得中国要负大部分责任，但并非所有的责任，就是所谓的「九二共识」。
我一年前上了大陆的电视，主持人，就像您一样，跟我说蔡总统为什么…不对，他没这么说。他说为什么蔡英文是这样的分离主义者？她为什么不同意九二共识？
我就说，我最近几年没有，但之前有跟蔡总统见面，在她担任其他职务的时候。她非常聪明，也很谦虚，也是个体贴的人。主持人就打断我说，我们在大陆，不会叫她蔡总统。我就提醒他，蔡是「民选」总统，不是像很多其他地方的「指派」总统。
黄宝慧：您直接跟中国人意见相左？
柯伟林：是的，最后，他们还是在电视上播出，谢谢他们宽宏大量。九二共识，我们必须记得，我曾经见过辜振甫先生，也跟他讨论过这个问题。这是「同意不同意/求同存异（agreement to disagree）」。如果认真看待，这是一个理想，我们应该都属于大中华，所谓的大中华人民，但具体来说，完全跟统一无关，也当然跟政治统一无关。它大体上是个虚构的概念，我们必须了解。在许多方面，中美之间1970年代的「一中政策」，也是针对什么叫做「一中」，采取「同意不同意/求同存异（agreement to disagree）」，这个作法也很有效。外交虚构（Diplomatic fictions）可以有非常大的效果，我当时说过，现在再说一次。如果九二共识顺其自然发展，倘若不再有用的话，如果要提出其他共识，也没那么难，或是提出其他说词，让中国和台湾能够在这个广大迷人的地方共存，在这个至少地区之外的人称为大中华的地方共存。
黄宝慧：太好了！谢谢教授。
柯伟林：我的荣幸。
以下为专访英文全文：
（Rebeca为主持人黄宝慧、Kirby为柯伟林）
Rebeca: Professor, we know that US President Trump and a Chinese leader just agreed to a temporary 90-day ceasefire at the G20 to defuse the tension, and why would they do that? and after 90 days, will the trade war will be restarted? And as of now, which country has the upper hand? Because you know I recalled in one of your interviews, you said that confrontation between the US and China is always bad news to Taiwan.
Kirby: I think that is absolutely true, and in this case Taiwan is a good bit of collateral damage in this trade dispute. You know I think neither side has the upper hand at this moment. It's a case of you know if it were to go on for a significant period of time, it's the economic version of mutually assured destruction. I don't think it will, because the relationship is simply too important to both China and to the United States. And there are too many actors on both sides, too many can call them interest groups, or too many people who are connected to the other economy, in both economies, to allow this to go on for long. That said, the pause as it were or the ceasefire in it, was from the American point of view an opportunity to allow the Chinese side to come up with some counter proposals. It's difficult…it's easy to imagine that one can… both sides will be able to declare victory in 90 days or 180 days. There are many face-saving ways out of these kind of trade disputes. The history of US-Japan relations shows many… The history actually in the 1980s of US-Taiwan economic tensions shows many ways around serious trade disputes.
What's not going to happen in 90 days is that the Chinese side, even if it wished to, is not going to be able to change its fundamental direction and the fundamental elements of its political and economic system which are actually in many ways at the heart of this dispute.
R: I noticed you had made some comments on Trump's administration. You once mentioned that in your interview with a Taiwan media before. You mentioned that the trade war between the US and China is caused by the Trump administration, which is not only unprofessional but also ignores the US-China trade ties and the international realities. So now…
K: I think I was quite correct.
R: Quite correct, yes. But we see now that the President Trump has taken a tough stance on China regarding trade, the South China Sea, and other matters. In the foreseeable future, will tensions continue to last in the US-China relations?K: I think they are likely to last in a multiple set of ways, but first, let me say that the first year and a half of the Trump administration in this policy area, as in virtually every other one, was marked by a remarkable combination of incompetence, disorganization, lack of preparation, in which you know if you would ask senior Chinese interlocutors whom to deal with in the Trump administration, the best that they could come up with was the Kushners. That's actually not quite good enough, quite frankly, and it's taken a very long time for the Trump administration to have senior people put in place in State Department, and Defense Department, National Security Council, who know anything serious about China. That said, now nearly two years into this administration, there is a beginning of a coherent policy toward China. It's very much of a hardline policy on multiple fronts on political matters, on ideological matters one might say, and on security matters, and on economic matters. And why this has happened? It's difficult to say, but you have the advisors around Trump right now, who are more of one voice than they have been in the past.
Mr. Pence probably is articulated this most recently and most clearly. But if you were to look at kind of large causal reasons, in the last five years under Xi Jinping, China has gone to the left very significantly. And for many observers, unexpectedly strongly to the left in favor of increased party control, increased state-owned enterprise, reduced access or apparently reduced access for international firms to Chinese market areas, seeking to create Chinese winners and national champions at home and abroad. Meanwhile, the United States under Trump has emerged in a fittingly…it has merged in a very disorganized way to the right. And so you have both sides having moved further apart on many issues. And I think that long-term trend is likely to continue, whether it's dealing with South China Sea, whether it is dealing with China's foreign relations here in East Asia, whether it is dealing with Chinese domestic economic policy or international economic policy.
R: You just mentioned Vice President Mike Pence. It seems like he takes a very hawkish stance on China. So Vice President Mike Pence gave a speech in October to give China a blunt warning. Many people see this as a way for the US to restart the Cold War. Will there be another Cold War? and what is difference between the Cold War between the US and USSR and the one between the US and China?
K: Well first of all, I don't think actually there will be another Cold War. You know the United States and China have so many more interests in common than the United States and the Soviet Union did. The United States and the Soviet Union during THE Cold War were locked in a global struggle for dominance, as it were. We’re not in a series of proxy wars around the world, had thousands of missiles pointed at each other, where swords pointed Berlin from 19th… from the beginning of the blockade …in 1948 through the duration of the Cold War till 1989 when the wall came down. It's a quite a different experience. They certainly had no expansive trade and cultural relations of the way that China and the United States, or China the United States have many many more things in common. But if you look at Pence’s speech, it's a fascinating speech. I would recommend that your viewers read the whole speech, and plus, it's an effort as a history, at a history of Chinese American relations, it's highly mythological. It’s the Chinese-American relations as the Americans would like to see them, or some Americans would like to see them.
For example, the Untied States and China, according to the speech, have always had wonderful relations until 1949. The United States was a beneficent power in China. It traded, say in the 19th century with China, with furs and spices. Somehow or other, Mr. Pence forgets opium, which was actually a very important source of trade for the Boston area. So it is...so I think I think that Pence’s speech is the most hardline articulation of a policy toward China since the 1950s or 1960s, and indeed it reads as if it was written in the in the 1950s or the 1960s, substituting China for the Soviet Union and for many parts of it. It will be an important speech only if things get out of hand. Right now I would take it as a statement of the hardest point of view from the American right vis-à-vis China.
R: Recently, there is a term called “Thucydides's Trap”. It’s also a theory developed by a professor at Harvard.
K: Professor Graham Allison from Kennedy School, where you graduated.
R: Yes, yes, yes. That means when one rising power challenges the existing superpower, then war is almost always inevitable. So what’s your view on that?
K: Well I'm a great friend and an admirer of Professor Graham Allison. I would respectfully disagree with him that as a historian, that it is true that a rising power always comes into conflict with an existing power. Sometimes it happens, very often it does not happen. There's a famous saying by the great British historian AJP Taylor who said, “War is never inevitable until it breaks out, and it is the job of statesmen to avoid war at all costs.” Look at the world in which we're in here in Taipei in 2018. This is a time of prosperity. It is a time of peace. We are in, from 1979 since the China's war with Vietnam to the present day, the longest period of peace in East Asia since the Opium War. Without peace, there is no prosperity. There is almost nothing that I can imagine, no scenario that I can imagine easily on the part of either China or the United States, that could have allowed us to think, how is our national interest accentuated by going to war with one another. China has no enemies. No one threatens China's borders. Not Russia, not Japan, not Taiwan, unless the Kuomintang wants to retake the mainland. Not Vietnam, no India. The only threat to China's borders comes from North Korea, because you never know where one of their missiles might come down. China is in the best strategic position of its modern history, and has to understand how precious this time is.
The United States, I think unhappily, in recent years, has never met a war. It didn't want to get into, but it has come at enormous cost that if you look at Afghanistan and Iraq. There is nothing in American strategic interest that should need to a military conflict with China. And so I do not believe that the war is inevitable nor do I believe it is even likely.
R: Now I feel more comfortable.
K: Good. Thank you.
R: We know that you are not only a China-US expert. You are also a Taiwan expert. We know that do you like Taiwan very much.
K: My first trip to Asia was in Taiwan many many years ago.
R: Where did you study Chinese?
K: I studied Chinese that here at 台湾师范大学国语中心, and did research at 中央研究院近代历史研究所, so Taiwan was actually one of the reasons why I became a professor, because of the great start that I had here in China studies in Taiwan.
R: Great! So you are a close observer of what happens in Taiwan. So right after Taiwan's local election results were announced in late November, it’s about two weeks ago, then the US State Department issue a message on Twitter saying that, “The United States congratulates Taiwan on a successful run of free and fair election, and your hard-earned constitutional democracy is an example for the entire Indo-Pacific.” So how would you interpret this message? and why it’s Indo Pacific? What is the US’s position?
K: It’s a good question. So you could argue that that's a statement in which the United States is suggesting that Taiwan could be a model for mainland China. It's not… it's more nuanced than that. Indo Pacific is a kind of an amorphous term. It could mean anything, you know from Pakistan to the Aleutians. But Taiwan as a remarkable example of a successful democracy is… this statement in my view is correct.
I mean votes are counted faster and more fairly in Taiwan than in any American State. I want you to be a model not just for the Indo-Pacific, but also for North America perhaps, but at least for the United States, where somehow we still have great difficulty having every vote counted.
R: Professor, we just mentioned the confrontation between the US and China is always bad news to Taiwan.
K: Yes.
R: So, being sandwiched between the US and China, Taiwan is impacted by both superpowers at all times. So how should the Taiwanese government respond?
K: I think Taiwan needs to take care of… the Republic of China needs to take care of its own interests, its own security. It should seek as friendly and strong as set of relations with both China and the United States as is possible in a way that allows for its security to be realized. Security and prosperity… over the last number of years, Taiwan has benefited enormously by its economic, and I should say its cultural associations with the Chinese mainland as well as of course with the United States. It has achieved a degree of normalization in cross-strait relations without unification. This is a remarkable achievement not to be easily endangered in my view.
And I think Taiwan should… you know… it may it may be not a good idea to take any more phone calls from Mr. Trump for President Tsai, but you know Taiwan has shown once again what a robust democracy it is, and it's a the achievement of this election, of the last election several years ago, of every one of the presidential elections that I've witnessed here in Taiwan. It's something that the citizens of the ROC should be very proud.
R: You just mentioned not a good idea to take more phone calls from President Trump. Okay well actually some people say that the incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen is favored by the US government, whereas a possible candidate for the next presidential election, your good friend, former President Ma Ying-jeou, is preferred by China. So what do you make of the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan?
K: Well, my guess is that it will be hotly contested, maybe not as hotly contested as the one in the United States at the same, but I disagree with the assessment that President Tsai, or President Ma, is favored by the United States, or not favored by the United States. We take that example. The United States favors anyone who is elected as president that who represents the people of Taiwan.
R: But China prefers Dr. Ma for sure.
K: It may be that President Ma’s term had a much longer period of more cordial relations with the Chinese mainland, but I think it's quite wrong to think that for example that the Kuomingtang’s successes in the recent elections are a referendum only on cross-strait relations. Certainly, the Kuomintang candidates are not necessarily pro-China. I think most candidates here, as far as I can tell, all candidates from all major parties are pro-Taiwan, first and foremost. How they differ, of course on how to deal with the mainland, what the principles of that relationship ought to be. But if you take the example that, and I here I blame the Chinese side quite a bit, but not entirely just the Chinese side, the so-called 1992 Consensus.
I was on a TV show on the mainland about a year ago and the interviewer that such as yourself said to me why is Presidents Tsai…no, he didn't say this. He said why is Tsai Ing-wen such a separatist? Why won't she agree to the 1992 Consensus?
And I said, well, I have met, not recently in recent years, but I have met President Tsai in her earlier positions. She's a very intelligent and moderate person, and a very thoughtful person, and then he interrupted me and he said, well we don't, in mainland, we don’t call her Presidents Tsai. And I reminded him that she was actually “elected” president, not “selected” as president as happens in some other places.
R: Do you confront the Chinese?
K: Right. At the end, they got that air on TV, so that was a very kind of them. The 1992 Consensus, we have to remember, and I once met Mr. 辜振甫and talked about this. This was an agreement to disagree. When you look at it in a serious way, it's an ideal that we should all be together, a kind of 大中华, that great Chinese people, but it has nothing in specific about unity and certainly not about political unification. It is it is largely a fiction, we have to understand. In many ways, the US and China, “one China policy” of the 1970s, is also an agreement to disagree on what we mean by “one China”, and that has worked very well. Diplomatic fictions can work extremely well, and if I said then, and I would say again today. If the 1992 Consensus has run its course, if it is no longer as useful as…, then you know it isn't that hard to come up with some other consensus, or some other way of phrasing a way in which China and Taiwan can cohabit this large and fascinating space, that is the world of what at least outside of this area we call Greater China.
R: Great! Thank you professor.
K: My pleasure.
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